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Transformation is about creative destruction: disman-
tling the old economic, political and social system and 
fostering a new one. A similar observation holds for eco-
nomic, political and social actors. The issue of creative 
destruction has been considered during transformation 
in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
(Murrell, 1992). Within it the importance of bottom-up 
processes in general and that of the creation of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been debat-
ed since the beginning (Kornai, 1990; Dallago, 1991). 
however, policies have been dominated by the need to 
stabilise, liberalise, and privatise quickly and on large 
scale (Sachs, 1993; Frydman – Rapaczynski, 1994) ac-
cording to the teaching of the Washington Consensus 
(Williamson, 1994; Rodrik, 2007).
Large scale privatisation has led to remarkable for-
mal success: by the end of the Nineties the economy 
was dominated by privately owned enterprises in near-
ly all former socialist countries. In spite of this formal 
success and improvement in restructuring (Fabrizio et 
al., 2009),2 CEEC economies have remained vulner-
able and their enterprises hardly competitive. There 
are important reasons to maintain that SMEs are a fun-
damental component of the economies competitive-
ness both in general (Audretsch, 2006; Erixon, 2009a; 
Gries – Naudé, 2010; Schmitz, 2004) and in the case of 
transformation economies (MacIntyre – Dallago, 2003; 
Aidis – Welter, 2008; Dallago – Guglielmetti, 2010). 
Along with the advantages of diffused entrepreneur-
ship and the favourable consequences for innovation, 
in transformation economies SMEs can embody market 
institutions and support their evolution much faster and 
at lower cost than more bureaucratic and conservative 
large companies. The latter have anyway to go through 
costly and lengthy privatisation and restructuring be-
fore strengthening their competitiveness.
Enterprises competitiveness is of great importance 
for modern economies and their management. This im-
portance has increased with the deepening of the trans-
formation process amidst growing integration of world 
economies (“globalisation”). The global openness and 
integration of economies have led in fact to deeper co-
ordination of macro-policies, which can now be used 
by national governments only amidst many limits. Con-
sequently, the differential push to competitiveness has 
been coming primarily from the institutional and micro-
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economic components of the economy. Entrepreneur-
ship and SMEs foundation and upgrading feature promi-
nently among the latter. In view of these developments, 
international and specialised organisations have tried to 
assess the factors supporting the innovative and com-
petitive effect of entrepreneurship and SMEs (Doing 
Business, 2009a; Kauffman Foundation, 2007; OECD, 
2008b). For countries in transformation, diffused entre-
preneurship, enterprise foundation and upgrading have 
a particular importance for growth and competitiveness 
both for the requests of the transformation process and 
the structural features of those economies. however, 
policies have been dealing with SMEs as a size category 
more than for their critical role in the economy.
Among transformation countries hungary presents 
perhaps the greatest puzzle. Thanks to the important at-
tempts at reforming her economy since 1968 and again 
during the Eighties (Kornai, 1986), hungary was consid-
ered to be the frontrunner in transformation. however, 
since 1989 the country suffered various policy and trans-
formation setbacks that increased the economic, social 
and political vulnerability and led to spread dissatisfac-
tion.3 Enterprises entered transformation with important 
advantages: fundamental laws for large companies were 
approved in the second part of the Eighties and SMEs 
boomed since early Eighties (Dallago, 1989). During the 
Nineties there was a massive inflow of foreign capital 
and the number of SMEs witnessed an incredible expan-
sion. During this decade one hungarian out of ten was 
registered as a businessman. In spite of this success, the 
hungarian economy lacked momentum and large part 
of the enterprises was not competitive and aimed at sur-
vival or only existed on statistical paper (Szirmai, 2003). 
Problems continued through the foll   owing decade. In-
deed, hungary’ performance is below average among 
CEECs according to various competitiveness ranking 
and SMEs are the least efficient by international stand-
ards (MNDE, 2009).
It is in this perspective that in recent years the hun-
garian government has considered the disappointing 
situation with entrepreneurship and SMEs as one of the 
causes of the unsatisfactory performance of the econ-
omy. This convincement has but accelerated since the 
dramatic effects of the international crisis. This paper 
considers what went wrong with SMEs, which consti-
tutes an important part of the hungarian transformation-
al drawback. The next sections consider some data and 
information (Section 1) that depict the unsatisfactory 
situation of hungarian SMEs, particularly concerning 
competitiveness (Section 2). Section 3 deals with the 
main individual factors that are behind the strategy to 
foster SMEs and Section 4 examines the effects of the 
international crisis and the new policy strategy. Section 
5 concludes.
Overview of the SME sector
Although large state owned firms dominated the econo-
my during the socialist period, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) were remarkably important particu-
larly since the 1968 economic reform (Dallago, 1989). 
In the process of transformation many new SMEs were 
founded, through genuine greenfield investment, spin-
offs, foreign direct investments and “spontaneous” 
privatisation (Dallago, 2003; Laki, 1998). The over-
whelming majority (99.9%) of enterprises in hungary 
are presently small and medium-sized and they provide 
more than two thirds of employment (table 1) and 80% 
of GDP (Estrin et al., 2009). Consequently, their com-
petitiveness fundamentally influences the performance 
of the whole economy. however, a clear dualism ap-
peared between the modern foreign-owned sector and 
the less dynamic domestic sector. The latter includes 
most SMEs which do not perform substantial invest-
ments and make use of underground economic prac-
tices (such as tax evasion) (Szirmai, 2003).
SMEs have been defined in Act XXXIv of 2004, 
which has confirmed the hungarian definition and 
practice to the European Commission recommendation 
2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003. Starting from 1 January 
2005, SMEs definition became more refined on finan-
cial and ownership issues. These concerned particularly 
the use of consolidated budget and the exclusion from 
the SME category of those enterprises whose capital is 
owned for more than 25% by the state, municipalities 
or large companies, separately or jointly. This criterion 
does not apply to institutional investors.
Notes: * including the financial sector.
Source: hCSO in the case of sales revenues and value added fig-
ures, MoET calculations for the rest 
0-1 2-9 10-49 50-249 SME total
Number of 
enterprises*
75.6 20.2 3.6 0.6 99.9
Employees* 6.0 21.9 21.6 19.5 68.9
Sales revenues 7.4 14.4 19.7 18.1 59.6
Export 5.9 5.5 10.3 13.5 35.3
value added 6.0 10.9 16.4 18.7 52.0
Equity 8.9 11.9 14.6 15.8 51.2
Table 1
Size distribution of Hungarian registered SMEs
(2005, in percent of all enterprises
according to workforce size categories)
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The hungarian Central Statistical Office (hCSO) 
adopted the new European method in 2005 thus de-
creasing substantially the number of operating enter-
prises. An enterprise is now considered to be operating 
in a given year if it had sales revenues or had at least 
one employee. In 2004 the number of operating enter-
prises was 871,956 and 708,307 according respectively 
to the old and the new methodology (MoET, 2007a: 
p.129-131.; Strategy, 2007; völfinger, 2005).
While microenterprises (with less than 10 employ-
ees) employ a higher share than in other transforma-
tion countries, except Poland, and EU-15 countries, 
the employment share of small (20-49 employees) 
and medium sized enterprises (50-249 employees) is 
lower than in other countries. Overall, the number of 
SMEs compared to the inhabitants and the employ-
ment share of SMEs remains higher in hungary and 
other transformation countries (with the relevant ex-
ception of Slovakia and Romania) than in EU-27 on 
average and is similar to the structure in the South-
ern EU member countries (Eurostat, 2008; OECD, 
2008c).4
Both sales revenue per enterprise and value added 
per employee are a fraction of the EU average in both 
relative (Table 2) and absolute terms (Table 3), with 
somewhat better performance only for small enterprises 
in sales revenue. Therefore, it is inevitable that labour 
cost per value added is higher in hungary, except in the 
case of microenterprises. however, the spread of the 
underground economy may influence the explanatory 
value of these data.
Note: EU-19: 15 Member States + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Nor-
way and Switzerland
Source: SMEs in Europe, 2003, Observatory of European SMEs, 
No. 7, calculations based on data provided by APEh
More than looking at comparisons with richer mar-
ket economies, for countries still undergoing some 
relevant transformation it may be important to look at 
developments. The data show that a substantial part of 
hungarian SMEs is weak also under this heading.
A MoET (2007a) survey distinguishes three differ-
ent groups of SMEs in terms of performance and this 
pattern has been stable since the late 1990s: a) fast-
growing enterprises: this group includes some 15% 
of SMEs whose yearly growth exceeds 20%, are often 
part of groups or value chains and networks, produce 
intermediate goods or business services, are active in 
public procurement tenders and innovative and ac-
tive in foreign markets, are endowed with important 
human and intellectual capital, make intensive use of 
specialized professional services, and of bank credit 
for their investments; b) stable enterprises: they rep-
resent 65-70% of the SME population, have low but 
positive performance and low qualification of their 
entrepreneurs/managers and employees, and produce 
mainly for the retail market without using bank credit, 
except microcredit and mutual guarantees; c) laggard 
enterprises include the 15-20% of isolated small en-
terprises and enterprises run by marginal businessmen 
(elderly, social and minority businessmen) with nega-
tive and declining performance, selling their products 
to the final consumers and making no use of external 
finance and services.
Table 2
Enterprises in Hungary (2005) compared to the EU-19 (2003) (EU-19=100) 
Table 3
Hungarian enterprises compared to EU-25 
(absolute values, EU=100)
Micro Small
Medium-
sized
SME 
together
Large Total
Average size hU/EU-19 59 107 102 61 83 58
Sales revenue per enterprise hU/EU-19 17 47 31 21 30 19
value added per employee hU/EU-19 17 19 15 17 20 17
Labour cost per added value hU/EU-19 71 111 135 103 119 109
Proportion of export in sales revenues (%) hU/EU-19 122 92 106 108 178 135
Micro Small Medium
SME 
total
Large
Number of 
enterprises
1,03 0,60 0,64 1,00 1,00
Number of 
employees
1,20 0,89 0,98 1,05 0,89
Sales revenues 1,09 0,98 0,97 1,01 0,98
Added value 0,84 0,85 1,03 0,90 1,13
Source: SMEs and Entrepreneurship in the EU, Statistics in 
focus 24/2006 (Strategy, 2007)
Problematic issues
Policies outcomes have been modest so far due to var-
ious reasons. First, programmes are usually episodic 
and uncoordinated. Second, they have failed in fos-
tering the entrepreneurs’ interest (particularly young 
and educated ones) to specialise, modernise and pro-
mote the growth of their enterprise. Third, nearly all 
programmes show time inconsistency and they are 
discontinued after relatively short time. Fourth, many 
programmes depend upon donors and do not involve 
the beneficiaries’ responsibility, e.g. by means of co-
financing. Fifth, the donor typically is not involved 
in following the outcome of the investment after the 
support is over: the relation between the donor and the 
beneficiary is usually formal and short-lived.
A sixth general problem is the lack of evaluation 
culture. Evaluation of policy programmes is impor-
tant in order to assess their efficacy and adjust them 
to goals and possibilities. Evaluation should follow a 
standardised approach in order to provide policy-mak-
ers, experts and the public with technically ground-
ed and comparable data (OECD, 2008a) and should 
avoid the well-known self-selection and committee 
selection problems5. Evaluation in hungary is only 
moving through the first steps, an evaluation culture 
is still lacking, and the insufficient continuity of the 
programmes prevents assessing themselves: time is 
not enough for seeing the impact of the programmes 
on the beneficiaries. Evaluation at the level of policy 
makers is still more formal than substantial, and only 
few programmes have been evaluated. Existing evalu-
ation is more an assessment done in terms of number of 
interventions (typically: how many enterprises – pos-
sibly distinguished by size class – applied to and re-
ceived funds from individual programs), jobs created 
and funds spent (possibly broken down by size class 
of enterprises and aim of the application). Typically 
the results of the programmes are not analysed against 
what would have happened without the programme.
To address this situation the government approved, 
on 10 October 2007, the Strategy for the Development 
of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (2007-2013) 
(Strategy, 2007) to pursue “the improvement of the 
economic performance of small and medium-sized en-
terprises” as part of the implementation of the National 
Strategic Reference Framework of hungary for the pe-
riod 2007-2013. Another important milestone in the 
development of a national SME strategy has been the 
approval by the European Commission of the Econom-
ic Development Operational Programme 2007-2013 
(MoET, 2008), a programme under the Convergence 
Objective providing for important financial support 
(€2.9 billion, of which some €2.5 billion are contribut-
ed by the EU) among other things to upgrade the SMEs 
competitiveness. The main objective of the Programme 
is to increase the value added and the jobs created by 
SMEs and their productivity by, among other things, 
facilitating SMEs access to finance and promoting the 
development of the business environment.
SME policy and programmes are designed with a 
long term perspective, aimed at ensuring entrepreneurs a 
more stable and predictable regulatory and policy frame-
work. however, while the Strategy pays attention to the 
supply side, i.e. actions and services provided to SMEs, 
it devotes less effort to the demand side, where many of 
SME’s problems originate and subsist. For instance, em-
phasis is put on the various instruments to ease SMEs’ 
financing constraints, but much less so to the critical is-
sue of how to increase the willingness and opportunities 
of entrepreneurs to ask for and use efficiently financial 
resources. Regional differences in SME characteristics 
and constraints are also a crucial component that should 
be considered when assessing the proper policy design. 
With the exception of EU funded projects, SME policy 
remains centralised in hungary.
The 2007 SMEs Strategy promises to initiate a new 
phase of evaluation in SME policies in hungary:  it in-
cludes monitoring and takes commitment for an inter-
im assessment of the outcome of the Strategy (Strategy, 
2007) by quantifying a set of targets and distinguishing 
them according to their nature and relevance (strategic 
targets, comprehensive objectives, horizontal targets). 
however, objectives are not always clearly and pre-
cisely specified. For instance, the strategic target “in-
creasing the economic performance of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises” is expressed as the increase of 
the ratio of gross value added produced by SMEs from 
the current 52% to 55% by 2013, without specifying 
the conditions, e.g. whether this will be the outcome 
of growing numbers of SMEs or growth of individual 
SMEs. This incompleteness makes it impossible to as-
sess whether a certain outcome (or failure) may be at-
tributed to the policy or some other unobserved event. 
Further, the Strategy may lack time continuity due to 
the implementation of new policy priorities and instru-
ments since late 2008.
Fostering SME Competitiveness
Many SMEs policy programmes focus on the size of 
enterprises, thus failing to consider whether their ac-
tivity has the potential to increase the competitiveness 
of enterprises and consequently generate economic 
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growth. hungarian policy-makers are apparently aware 
of this problem and have become attentive to policies 
supporting SMEs competitiveness. however, various 
flaws still remain in policies. I shall consider the fol-
lowing critical aspects: a) the business environment; b) 
human resources; c) access to financing; d) barriers to 
SMEs access to international markets.
a. The business environment. Entrepreneurs in hun-
gary continue to identify high tax and social security 
burdens as the single most important factor impeding 
firms operations (Table 5, MoET, 2007a), although this 
rating has declined between 1997 and 2007 as the tax 
system has been repeatedly reformed. Considerable 
improvements include lowering corporate tax to 16%, 
with additional easing for lower tax base, and the in-
troduction of the simplified entrepreneurial tax. Social 
security payments6 remain particularly high for labour-
intensive SMEs, which find it more difficult than large 
firms to make use of tax allowance. The fiscal burden 
represents 38.6% of hungary’s GDP, a rate lower than 
the EU-25 average (40.9%), but significantly higher 
than in visegrád countries. The tax system compares 
with low tax moral, which places hungary at a low 111th 
in the overall ranking of World Bank – Doing Business 
(WB-DB) 2009 and 11th in EECA region (Table 4).
variability and unpredictability of economic regu-
lation are perceived to be the second main obstacle 
to the operation of enterprises. They are particularly 
problematic for small enterprises, which lack internal 
capacities to deal with it and may have to use costly ex-
ternal support services. Change of regulation has been 
in part the result of compliance with the acquis com-
munataire, in that regulation regarding the SME sector 
was harmonised following EU membership. however, 
unpredictability has been primarily the outcome of do-
mestic changes.
According to the European Commission, in the EU-
25 administrative burdens of entrepreneurs make up 
on average 3.5% of GDP (Strategy, 2007). MoET es-
timates that direct burdens to hungarian entrepreneurs 
(comprising data provision to the public administration 
and other burdens related to public administration pro-
cedures) may amount to 4.5–6.7% of the GDP. About 
1.5% of these stem from EU obligations, while a larger 
part is generated by the hungarian regulatory and pub-
lic administration environment.
According to WB-DB (2009) rankings, hungary 
scores 41st-out of 181 countries as concerns “ease of do-
ing business”, and 7th in Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
(EECA) (Table  2). however, while starting a business 
witnessed an impressive improvement in 2009, dealing 
with construction permits remains a serious obstacle to 
SME formation. Closing a business is somewhat less 
problematic although not satisfactory. Efficient bank-
ruptcy laws and procedures are important factors for a 
conductive business environment. Although according 
to WB-DB hungary ranks 12th in enforcing contracts 
and 2nd in the EECA region, bankruptcy procedure is 
harsh for both debtors and creditors, and does not facil-
itate recovery particularly for small enterprises. Com-
panies in trouble have maximum 150 days to negotiate 
with their creditors and recover. As a consequence, only 
8 enterprises restructured in 2006 out of 14 933 enter-
prises which went through bankruptcy procedures, and 
9439 came under liquidation. This outcome can be as-
cribed to various factors including: increasing defaults 
on payments from clients and contractors, limited use of 
credit insurance, lack of professional management and 
evaluation culture in domestic SMEs. The new Bank-
ruptcy Act should unify to one procedure the presently 
separate bankruptcy and liquidation procedures and 
shorten the time needed for liquidation (Strategy, 2007; 
FBD, 2007; Simon – Turóczi, 2007).7
Although property rights are in general well-defined 
and protected, other aspects related to this issue need to 
be clearly set. Registering property has been substan-
tially improving but is still problematic (WB-DB scores 
Ease of...
Doing Bu-
siness 2009 
(2008),
total rank*
Doing Busi-
ness 2009
EECA rank**
Doing Business 41   (50) 7
Starting a Business 27   (72) 6
Dealing with Construction Permits 89   (90) 12
Employing Workers 84   (83) 12
Registering Property 57   (98) 13
Getting Credit 28   (25) 10
Protecting Investors 113 (110) 23
Paying Taxes 111 (109) 11
Trading Across Borders 68   (49) 10
Enforcing Contracts 12   (13) 2
Closing a Business 55   (56) 6
Table 4.
The Hungarian economy
in the World Bank Doing Business Rankings, 2009
(2008 in parenthesis)
Note: Doing Business 2008 rankings have been recalculated to 
reflect changes to the methodology and the addition of three new 
countries.
*  181 countries
** Eastern Europe & Central Asia, 27 countries
Source: The World Bank Group, Doing Business
are 57 on 181 and 13 on 27 respectively in the overall 
and the EECA indexes), and even more problematic is 
the protection of investors (scores are respectively 113 
and 23). Only 65% of hungarian enterprises are aware 
of industrial property rights protection issues and 40% 
are involved in their protection through means such as 
trademarks, patents, and licences.
Over the last decade, information and communica-
tion technologies (ICTs) have opened up ever increas-
ing opportunities for SMEs, allowing the advantages of 
small scale to be combined with economies of scale and 
scope through networking among firms and with other 
actors such as universities and research institutions. 
In recent years the use of ICTs increased considerably 
among hungarian SMEs, but remains at relatively low 
levels of technical sophistication (i.e. using a compu-
ter and holding an internet connection). hungary falls 
behind the European average with respect to: i) the use 
of more sophisticated technologies (broadband access), 
although not behind most new EU member countries; 
ii) the weight of security in business decisions; iii) the 
share of companies using digital signatures; and iv) 
the use of electronic commerce by hungarian enter-
prises (less than half the EU average, the last position 
in the EU). Even worse is the gap in the use of more 
sophisticated IT and e-business solutions, in which 
hungary ranks very low in the EU, at a considerable 
distance from the best performers. The performance is 
very weak in the share of enterprises having internal 
company processes and external integrated company 
processes.  In all these aspects SMEs fare considerably 
worse than large firms (e.g. in broadband internet pen-
etration, the gap is close to 50% – MoET, 2007a), with 
the partial exception of medium-sized companies.
Further development of E-government is important 
because it can substantially improve the productivity of 
the public administration, significantly decrease trans-
action costs of enterprises, and reduce the discretional-
ity of public administrations, thus improving the qual-
ity of compliance with rules and accountability. This 
contributes to create a more predictable environment 
for enterprises. E-government services completely ac-
cessible electronically for the general public (50%) are 
higher than the EU average (36%), due to the substan-
tial improvement during the past few years. however, 
in the case of enterprises, hungary ranks only 21st, sig-
nificantly behind the European average (MoET, 2007a; 
UN, 2005).
b. Human resources, motivation, and networking. 
Managerial weaknesses are a key cause of (small) busi-
ness failure and a shortage of skilled workers is a barrier 
to innovation. Together with regulation, human resourc-
es are apparently and important weakness of hungar-
ian SMEs. Traditional formal education is good, but 
the country ranks below European average concerning 
life-long learning and the share of students in the tech-
nical and natural sciences. Most non-corporate R&D 
personnel is employed in higher education institutions. 
Training, education to entrepreneurship, e-learning and 
distance learning and R&D human resources are all at 
rather low levels in SMEs. Along with being at low 
level, R&D also has excessive concentration at (mostly 
large) enterprises with foreign ownership: these con-
centrate nearly 80% of corporate research, while only 
2-3% of SMEs are innovative pioneers and 20-22% are 
imitators (Strategy, 2007).
The willingness to start-up companies has sig-
nificantly deteriorated in the population (CSO, 2006; 
GEM, 2008).8 There may be different reasons for this 
trend, including that the post-transition years of enthu-
siasm and great opportunities are over. however, this 
could also be related to the fact that the best motivated, 
skilled and educated people are attracted by the work-
ing conditions and salaries offered by multinational 
subsidiaries operating in hungary. Existing SMEs 
show high concentration in more traditional branches, 
in particular real estate trading and renting, traditional 
business support services, trade, construction industry. 
Although this may be an answer to market demand, 
hungarian entrepreneurs apparently tend to avoid high 
risk, knowledge and technology-based competitive in-
dustries and prefer those that require lower capital in-
tensity, guarantee rapid returns and do not require par-
ticular technical skills.
As in many OECD countries, there is also an increas-
ing trend in SMEs to specialise in their core business 
and subcontract some operating functions (accounting, 
marketing, legal, technical, IT and other services) to 
other specialised SMEs. This trend may be associated 
to the labour market regulation and lack of flexibility, 
which can have the detrimental effect of raising the risk 
associated with increasing employment: according to 
WB-DB employing workers is ranked a low 84 and 12 
overall and in EECA respectively.
There is also an increasing trend to networking that 
by now involves more than half of SMEs, (MoET, 
2007a). About 57% of all enterprises participated in 
2005 in some form of formal or informal cooperation 
with other enterprises (counselling, borrowing tools, 
machines or money, acquiring business, etc.). Of these 
17% are engaged in formal cooperation (joint pur-
chase, sales, production). however, most of these are 
soft forms of networking and production networking 
is scarce. A promising although limited development is 
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the increase of ownership cross-holding, which is pull-
ing cross-investment. This is leading to greater corpo-
rate concentration and may strengthen the enterprises 
resource base and performance.
A considerable effort was performed in the past 
years to set up a network of industrial parks and oth-
er infrastructural devices such as regional university 
knowledge centres, which by now have a fair situation. 
Although they may be important tools for solving the 
enterprises location problems and facilitate business 
cooperation, their effect is modest: there have been few 
spin-offs and the infrastructure supporting innovation 
has remained weak in general (Strategy, 2007).
c. Access to financing. Although hungarian SMEs 
have been the only net job creators over the past 15 
years, their performance has been modest in relation 
with the growing amount of resources, including for-
eign and EU resources, spent to support this sector. 
Moreover, less than 4% of SMEs benefited from devel-
opment programmes, with the lowest rate in the small-
est size classes. Before the 2008 crisis financial needs 
were ranked low among the impediments to the growth 
of enterprises (Table 5). This may be due to both credit 
aversion by entrepreneurs and to banks targeting more 
developed clients, together with the absence of sig-
nificant programmes for potential entrepreneurs (JER-
EMIE, 2007).
The hungarian experience – similar to that of other 
former transformation countries – is that lack of fi-
nancing is not an important obstacle to the creation 
of small firms, which rely on informal sources or, for 
some firms, parent companies. however, the inability 
or unwillingness to access external finance is critical 
for the development of these SMEs (McIntyre – Dal-
lago, 2003). Since 1999 financing issues have become 
increasingly less problematic, reflecting the fact that 
commercial banks and savings cooperatives increas-
ingly served SMEs with new loan products and serv-
ices. In the WB-DB ranking hungary gets a fair 28 in 
the overall ranking and 10 in that referring to EECA 
for getting credit. The EBRD index of banking sec-
tor reform is in fact 4.0 in 2008, as it was in 2001, 
and that of non-bank financial institutions improved 
in the same period from 3.7 to 4.0. This puts hungary 
on top of other central European new member coun-
tries. Domestic credit to the private sector compared 
to GDP improved from 30.9% to 54.6% leaving the 
other central European countries at distance. Also, the 
government took positive steps to ease the traditional 
SME aversion of large banks, particularly with the 
multi-pillar special credit system set up in 2003 and 
jointly operated by various credit institutions and or-
ganisations.9
The limited financial penetration is due to differ-
ent factors: ignorance or worry of many entrepreneurs 
of the existing possibilities and their features and fear 
or inability of growing; insufficiently developed guar-
antee and insurance system; weak reputation and trust 
preventing the matching of demand and supply; fear 
to weaken or jeopardise the owners’ control over the 
enterprise. These problems require a broad spectrum of 
financing solutions and education of entrepreneurs.
1997 1998 1999 2003 2005 2007
high tax and social contribution liabilities 84 78 73 74 72 77
Unpredictability of economic regulation 62 58 53 58 55 63
Strong competition 53 57 61 61 61 56
Shortage of orders 48 45 52 45 48 45
Unfair competition 46 44 44 47 48 45
Delayed payments of customers 30 31 30 32 34 35
Shortage of capital 40 37 37 34 32 31
Other inhibiting factors 19 20 17 16 13 19
Procurement difficulties 14 16 16 17 16 13
Obsoleteness of existing capacities 17 19 17 17 13 12
Shortage of loans 27 26 26 20 15 12
Shortage of labour 9 9 9 12 8 9
Source: MNDE (2008), p. 159.
Table 5
Factors impeding enterprise growth in Hungary
Other financing instruments show a similar pattern: 
rapid development, inability to attract the most enter-
prises, and overall modest effect (JEREMIE, 2007; 
MoET, 2007b). The importance of microfinance has 
been rapidly decreasing, while banks have preferred to 
target stronger clients. There is currently no significant 
programme targeting potential entrepreneurs. Perhaps 
the most successful among financial instruments has 
been leasing, whose amount has increased threefold be-
tween 2000 and 2005 reaching 5.4% of GDP. however, 
80% of transactions are related to vehicles. Factoring 
is still highly underdeveloped, similarly to business 
angels and venture capital: the latter concentrates on 
expanding businesses and is nearly absent in the seed 
stage and weak in the start-up stage. Credit guarantee 
for SMEs is improving but still insufficient and the ma-
jority of guarantee operations relate to loans extended 
to microenterprises.
d. Access to international markets. Although near-
ly two thirds of exports come from large enterprises 
(table 1), primarily from the subsidiaries of multina-
tional companies, the propensity to international trade 
of hungarian SMEs is generally high in international 
comparison, particularly in the case of microenterpris-
es (Table 2). In most countries barriers involve critical 
SMEs aspects: capabilities, finance and access (OECD, 
2007). Increasing export is prominent among the Strat-
egy objectives, which foresees a 2% increase over 2005 
of the SMEs export participation, although other forms 
of internationalisation do not receive attention. Increas-
ing SMEs international activity will be possible only if 
hungary is able to remove part of the barriers to foreign 
trade that for the time being rank the country only 68th 
in the WB-DB general index of trading across borders 
and 10th in the EECA index.
Top barriers include inadequate quantity of, and 
untrained personnel for internationalisation, and lim-
ited or problematic access to foreign markets. The lat-
ter includes limited information to locate and analyse 
markets, and identifying foreign business opportunities 
and barriers belonging in the business environment, 
like unfamiliar exporting procedures and paperwork. 
Working capital to finance exports is apparently suffi-
cient for high-growth SMEs, but is an important barrier 
for more traditional enterprises.
It is interesting to notice that in addition to the ad-
vantages deriving from EU integration, hungary has an 
information, knowledge and relational advantage in the 
neighbouring countries in regions inhabited by hun-
garians. This is apparently a factor easing also capabili-
ties barriers, particularly those related to the inability to 
contact potential foreign costumers.
The international crisis: A watershed?
SMEs are found to be important in cyclical downturns 
and recessions (Erixon, 2009a, 2009b; vandenberg, 
2009). In fact and while crises are usually caused by 
the financial sector or large enterprises, SMEs are 
more resilient since they are more flexible, more ori-
ented toward the domestic economy and to services, 
more family based and less prone to downsize employ-
ment. however, this greater dependence upon domestic 
demand and the limited amount of internal resources 
make SMEs more sensitive to the events in the domes-
tic economy in both downturns and recovery. Since 
countercyclical measures tend to support domestic de-
mand, these have a disproportionate effect on SMEs.
The international financial crisis is rooted in a com-
bination of factors common to previous financial crises 
and some new factors, including deficiencies in finan-
cial regulation and architecture. Of relevance is the fact 
that financially integrated markets, while offering many 
benefits, can also pose significant risks, with large real 
economic consequences (Claessens, 2010). The crisis, 
which has had important direct budgetary costs, has 
been particularly aggressive in hungary: the country 
was the first EU member country to request an urgent 
loan package to the IMF, the European Union and the 
World Bank to avoid sovereign default and currency col-
lapse in October 2008. Reasons for this vulnerability in-
clude irresponsible and inconsistent fiscal policy stance 
in particular since 2001, high debt, domestic monetary 
policy and the nature of the country integration into the 
international financial system (Andor, 2009).
Poor fiscal policy quality (Staehr, 2010; Winkler, 
2010), policy mistakes and the lack of structural reform in 
hungary led to a record deficit, rapidly increasing debt10 
and a serious drop in competitiveness by 2006. The 2006 
reform programme, including the Strategy discussed 
herewith, reached some success and avoided the immedi-
ate crisis, but could not solve most of the structural prob-
lems. Particularly problematic are the structural features 
and weaknesses of the economy: considerable foreign 
trade exposure, weak export structure and performance, 
particularly by the domestic sector, significant external 
debt. Foreign ownership of banks, that was found to con-
tribute to financial vulnerability (Popov – Udell, 2010), 
represents a slight advantage for hungary, thanks to the 
stronger position and higher capitalisation of domestic 
banks (particularly OTP). however, the tendency of for-
eign banks to lend in foreign currency (Stein, 2010) has 
been particularly great in hungary, which increased fi-
nancial instability of consumers and local SMEs in the 
wake of the forint rapid devaluation (by 40% against the 
Euro between August 2008 and March 2009).
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Even more important have been the crisis indirect 
effects on the real economy through depressed rev-
enues and spending, lower economic growth and in-
creased unemployment (Staehr, 2010). Consequences 
for SMEs have been consequently important. The in-
ternational crisis has thus been particularly severe, as 
reflected in the depressed mood of the business com-
munity that continues through 2010.11 The crisis has 
put a stop to a growth process that was based on flow of 
external funds and internal consumption largely funded 
through loans. The drop of the value of real estate, by 
far the most important asset in households’ portfolio 
(horváth – Körmendi, 2009) has significantly weak-
ened the value of the most typical collateral that SMEs 
use, thus adding a further debilitating effect.12
The effect of the crisis on SMEs has been generally 
harsh (hodorogel, 2009). In most of the 29 countries 
reviewed by the OECD, including hungary (OECD, 
2009; OECD-Intesa, 2009) SMEs report a severe de-
cline in demand for their goods and services, although 
the magnitude of the shock differs from country to 
country. Increase in reported defaults, insolvencies and 
bankruptcies and increased payment delays – which 
add to the endemic shortage of SMEs’ working capital 
and their decreased liquidity – further strengthen fall 
in sales. SMEs adaptation to the crisis has been ap-
parently contrasted by the banks’ policy. Indeed, the 
conditions on access to bank credit have generally and 
significantly worsened, thus exposing SMEs to two 
mutually reinforcing shocks: a demand slump and a 
financial shock. In fact, evidence suggests that credit 
has decreased as a source for financing SMEs invest-
ment projects and SMEs’ demand for working capi-
tal and short-term loans has been reduced, although 
not as dramatically as for investment purposes. Banks 
have tightened lending policies in terms of guarantees, 
collateral and amounts, although not exclusively to-
wards SMEs, and in some countries have substantially 
increased the cost (and spreads) of credit to all their 
clients.
SMEs response include: a. cost-cutting, particu-
larly of the wage bill, to restore profitability and ad-
just production to lower demand; b. search for addi-
tional sources of liquidity (e.g. extending own payment 
delays and reducing or suppressing dividends); and 
c. postponing investment and expansion plans. The 
governments’ anti-crisis packages have tried to ease 
SMEs’ financing problems. These packages include: 
a. supporting sales and working capital through export 
credit and insurance, tax reductions and deferrals, bet-
ter payment discipline by governments; b. enhancing 
SME’s access to liquidity through bank recapitalisation 
and most often expansion of existing loan and credit 
guarantee schemes; and c. helping SMEs investments 
by means of grants and credits, accelerated deprecia-
tion, and R&D financing.
In hungary, the oversized state and internal con-
sumption generated sustained external financing needs 
and demand for credit. Growing exposure and increas-
ing real interest rates in the domestic market led the 
majority of companies and households to incur their 
debts in foreign currencies: retail loans in foreign cur-
rencies increased from 0% in 1997 to 18% in 2003 and 
70% in 2008. In a 2009 World Bank cross-country sur-
vey, in hungary 52.4 percent of firms – mostly domes-
tic oriented – were found to have an average of 67.3% 
of foreign-currency denominated debt (Correa – Iootty, 
2010). In spite of marked improvement of the financial 
situation since 2006, the external vulnerability of the 
economy remained acute and the crisis further exacer-
bated it (MEh, 2009; MNB, 2009).
The crisis has impacted on a country in difficult sit-
uation, including low employment rates and prolonged 
recession, high dependence on exports and high exter-
nal debt, being a substantial part of the latter in foreign 
currencies. In the effort of adjusting to the crisis the 
government implemented a set of crisis management 
measures at the end of 2008. These measures eased 
the pressure upon the economy and laid the ground 
for implementing a new comprehensive and long-term 
strategy pursuing short term mitigation of the crisis, 
including assuring budget equilibrium and support-
ing employment, and long term reforms (MEh, 2009; 
OECD-Intesa, 2009). This new strategy addresses four 
mutually reinforcing structural problems, which reduce 
significantly the growth potential. These are: a) the ob-
solete state with high expenditures, and excessive level 
and inadequate structure of redistribution; b) low em-
ployment; c) the weak structure of the real economy; 
and d) high financing needs.
The government took determined policy measures in 
April 2009 to decrease the economy’s vulnerability and 
restore the country’s credibility (CEC, 2009). These in-
cluded export-guarantee and -insurance to firms as well 
as state-backed and subsidised loans plus a set of meas-
ures for fiscal stabilization (including shortened mater-
nity leave, increased pension age, changes in the tax 
system and social security contribution, public works 
programmes, job protection measures and reform of 
unemployment benefits). however, in spite of deter-
mined action and the success in reaching greater stabil-
ity of the domestic banking sector (MNBb), “hungar-
ian economic recovery is likely to lag behind that of 
developed countries and the economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe on account of persistently weak domes-
tic demand” (MNB, 2010a).
The 2009 economic strategy (MEh, 2009) is im-
plemented in two phases: a) managing the conse-
quences of the world economic crisis and preserving 
a balanced budget on the short term together with in-
creasing the level of employment and creating the ba-
sis for economic growth; and b) restructuring public 
finances, improving the supply of and access to public 
services and various structural measures in the longer 
term. The first phase comprises five aims, including 
the support to developing the economy and infrastruc-
ture, which is highly relevant for SMEs. An important 
aim is establishing a work friendly tax regime by sub-
stantially decreasing taxes and social security contri-
butions on wages (by 7% in two years). Fiscal balance 
is pursued through transferring taxation to other items, 
including increasing value added taxes, excise taxes, 
property taxes and fighting tax evasion and avoidance. 
Other aims include developing a targeted social net 
encouraging work; a stable and predictable pension 
system; and establishing a cheaper state and a new 
policy making.
International action, the international financial sup-
port package to hungary, and the measures taken by 
the hungarian authorities have reduced the country’s 
vulnerability (IMF, 2009, MNB, 2009). however, the 
economy is in serious recession (MNDE, 2010a), and 
this jeopardises the financial stability and solvency of 
the economy (Barrell – holland, 2010). In fact, banks 
liquidity and solvency risks are still high. Measures 
supporting bank lending have therefore received atten-
tion and authorities’ and parent banks’ interventions 
have reduced liquidity risks.
The deteriorating macroeconomic environment and 
the increasing risk aversion of banks are diminishing 
credit demand from and supply to the corporate and 
household sector. The reduction is more pronounced 
for SMEs than for large corporations and SMEs situ-
ation is particularly fragile, since they have a higher-
than-average proportion of short-term loans. however, 
SMEs benefit the most from domestic and European 
refinancing programmes.
Taxation of enterprises changed and became more 
favourable to SMEs that invest and increase employ-
ment and less favourable to larger enterprises (APEh, 
2010). Indeed, while corporate (profit) tax rate increased 
to 19% effective from January 2010 and foreign asso-
ciations have a corporate tax rate of 30%, up from the 
previous reduction to 16%, most credits and allowances 
reducing the corporate tax base were cancelled, except 
investment benefits (development reserve, investment 
benefit for SMEs, accelerated depreciation). Contribu-
tions payable by employers were reduced from 32% to 
27%. The government foresees that taxation of enter-
prises will decrease overall by some hUF 40 billion 
(approximately €135 million).
The government has introduced four new pro-
grammes since November 2008 and has eased the con-
ditions of some existing ones in order to mitigate the 
funding problems faced by SMEs (MNB, 2009). The 
new support is in two forms: three new programmes 
supporting the banking system in refinancing cor-
porate loans,  financed mainly from EU sources (Új 
Magyarország Working Capital Credit Program, 
SME Credit Program, venture Capital Program), and 
measures providing subsidies on interest or guarantee 
scheme through the state budget. The overall short-
term support is hUF 140 billion (€480 million) cor-
responding to 10% of the total volume of SME loans 
maturing within a year. The overall provision of new 
funds amounts to hUF 225 billion (€780 million).13
The new economic policy aims also at introducing 
some important structural measures aimed at strength-
ening the hungarian economy so to support post-crisis 
development. Among these structural measures the 
development of SMEs is prominent. The main aim is 
upgrading the large part of SMEs that is presently stag-
nant and serving primarily the domestic market. The 
objective is not new in that it consists of making these 
SMEs competitive players also in the international 
market, particularly in the branches where hungary 
has a comparative advantage and where jobs can be 
created.
To this end, the government intends to use two main 
sets of instruments: assisting financially the enterpris-
es’ market entry and reducing administrative burdens. 
Instruments span from action aimed at improving the 
context (e.g. international diplomatic effort to promote 
exports, cutting bureaucracy and regulation, faster pro-
cedures in lawsuits, electronic payment of orders, sup-
port to research and development, security of energy 
supply, development of infrastructure) through finan-
cial support (credit programmes, state-backed export 
credit insurance) to real services (public procurement 
programme, export promotion, electronic registration 
of companies in one hour, simplification of site au-
thorisation). Noteworthy are public procurement pro-
grammes and reduction of administrative burdens. As 
to the former and in compliance with the EU Small 
Business Act, SMEs with less than net hUF 1 billion 
revenues a year (€3,4 million) use a simplified proce-
dure supported by the contracting authority starting 
from 1 July 2009. The government also decided to re-
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duce the administrative burden of the enterprises aris-
ing from national regulation by at least 25% by 2012. 
The Government also worked out and is implementing 
programmes aimed at fostering both vertical and hori-
zontal integration of SMEs. A programme supporting 
SMEs suppliers to large companies in the processing 
industry has started in February 2008 with EU funds. 
A competitiveness pole programme encouraging net-
working and cluster formation and development has 
also been launched.
Firms in general and SMEs in particular have re-
sponded fairly to these measures. Indeed, according to 
a World Bank cross-country business survey in Eastern 
Europe14 released at the end of 2009 hungarian firms 
appear to be among the least affected by the financial 
crisis (Fodor – Poór, 2009; Ramalho et al., 2009; WB, 
2009; Correa – Iootty, 2010). The survey found that the 
major effect of the crisis is a drop in demand (lower 
in hungary than elsewhere) which has caused a drop 
in employment15 affecting mostly permanent employ-
ees and has pushed firms to use more internal funds 
to finance their working capital and postpone invest-
ments. The latter effect has been important particularly 
in hungary (+4%), evenly spread across all firm sizes 
and industries. Supply-side effects, and particularly so 
access to credit, have appeared to be generally less rele-
vant than during previous crises, but less so for a larger 
number of companies in hungary (29.1 percent). Also 
household and corporate debt – particularly the former 
including SMEs debt – has fallen back to 2008 level up 
to mid-2009 and then stagnated thanks to the signifi-
cant appreciation of the forint (MNDE, 2010b).
Although in general the percentage change in sales 
is inversely related with the size of the firm, in hungary 
medium-size firms has shown a slightly smaller drop 
in sales than large firms and also capacity utilisation 
has witnessed little change (–5%). An important idi-
osyncrasy also exists in employment: while large firms 
significantly reduced permanent employment (particu-
larly so firms in domestic ownership), SMEs increased 
their permanent employment although freezed wages. 
Overall, fewer firms are really in financial distress 
compared to the other countries.
Conclusions
SMEs have great potential in hungary and have reached 
fair results. Their importance in the economy, their job 
creation and innovation potential justify special at-
tention and care. The perspectives of the hungarian 
economy depend to large extent upon the competitive-
ness of SMEs, which account for much of employment 
and important parts of production and exports. In spite 
of internal and external constraints, progress has been 
made in recent years in policy-making and achieve-
ments related to SMEs. The goal of upgrading SMEs 
and strengthening their contribution to the economy has 
acquired important position in the government agenda 
and policy goals. While progress took place, there are 
also problematic areas and in some cases drawbacks 
have happened. The international crisis has exacerbat-
ed drawbacks.
SME policies have been neither cost-effective nor 
sufficiently stable in time or appropriate to foster hun-
garian SMEs’ competitiveness in the globalised econo-
my. Policies have been so far more targeted to existing 
SMEs and are lacking the full entrepreneurial dimen-
sion necessary to foster innovative and internationally 
competitive SMEs. Important issues such as awareness 
and capacity building, opportunity recognition and uti-
lization have been overlooked. As a consequence, most 
SMEs have created jobs but hardly innovated and be-
come competitive. This is the challenge for the years 
to come.
The pre-crisis Strategy denotes a serious effort in 
overcoming the main problems afflicting the sector. It 
affords a detailed and realistic situation analysis and 
builds upon it the detailed formulation of a new strat-
egy for the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Yet it fails to tackle the critical issue of en-
trepreneurship satisfactorily. Through the Strategy the 
government placed SMEs policies in a perspective that 
is broader, more detailed, better defined and better co-
ordinated both internally and with other policy areas. It 
also avoided in its design the danger of interfering with 
the market by pursuing healthier cooperation between 
the public and private sectors. however, problems re-
main open and questions remain unanswered or the an-
swer is short to the reality.
The new post-crisis development strategy is appar-
ently wise in that it does not concentrate exclusively on 
crisis management and advances further in a balanced 
direction. Indeed, it aims at making the establishment 
and management of new enterprises easier and cheaper, 
thus hopefully reviving hungarian entrepreneurial at-
titudes and making existing SMEs stronger and more 
competitive. however, two caveats are worth stressing.
First, although the strategy includes several wise 
and sound aspects, it still requires more precise priori-
ties. It includes too many goals, although these are de-
sirable in themselves. Second, the danger is still up that 
the new strategy can be a new chapter in the old prob-
lem of policy instability and unpredictability: although 
motivated by sharable and desirable aims, it also in-
cluded components (e.g. in taxation policy) that invert 
previous goals. Whether it will actually result in an 
important step forward will depend upon the long-run 
consistency of its implementation, the careful defini-
tion of priorities and the effective cooperation between 
government and the business sector.
The international crisis has made the heavy indebt-
edness in foreign currencies and the budget deficit dif-
ficult to manage. Therefore, macroeconomic policies 
have taken the lead in the government’s concern and 
priorities. however, the forint depreciation – particu-
larly until raw materials remained relatively cheap, had 
some advantage primarily for SMEs, supporting their 
export. This period was short, and was followed soon 
by substantial forint appreciation, that has had the merit 
of decreasing the burden of debt in foreign currencies.
The country has been recovering from a serious fi-
nancial crisis with fair results, including the compara-
tively fair resilience of SMEs, overcoming a potentially 
very risky situation, and is now confronting the real ef-
fect of the crisis. The government has been inevitably 
led to pay absolute priority to the macro-stabilisation of 
the economy. Amidst these urgent and pressing goals 
the SME strategy implementation and even the issue of 
weak SMEs competitiveness has been lost of sight. This 
is understandable, although it may have negative long-
run consequences. It is to be seen whether this neglect 
has been a short-term price paid to more urgent needs 
that will be overcome soon with stronger determina-
tion. The country serious vulnerability, that the crisis 
revealed beyond doubt, requires that the issue of SMEs 
competitiveness is placed again and with stronger de-
termination at the centre of the policy stage.
Footnote
 1 This research was funded by the Autonomous Province of Trento, 
as the sponsor of the OPENLOC research project under the call 
for proposals “Major Projects 2006”. I thank Jacopo Sforzi for 
support in the research.
 2 The share of high-tech and medium-high-tech exports increased 
remarkably in various countries, including hungary. however, 
this was primarily the effect of foreign investment.
 3 Presently hungarians are the most dissatisfied among Central 
and Eastern Europeans (Pew Research Center, quoted in hvG, 
26 December 2009: p. 7.).
 4 http://www.simondyda.net/2009/05/sme-week.html (May 7, 
2009)
 5 In case of self-selection, programmes seeking, e.g., to provide 
support for rapidly growing businesses may see greater participa-
tion by growth-propense businesses than by growth-averse or un-
ambitious businesses and this is only partly reflected in “observ-
able” factors. Committee selection refers to programmes where 
the committee is effective in selecting those firms likely to per-
form superiorly. Even if the programme did not exist, the selected 
firms would be expected to have outperformed the other firms 
and observed differences in performance between programme 
participants and matched firms cannot be attributed solely to pro-
gramme participation.
 6 The overall rate of burdens on wages (including social security, 
vocational training and employer’s contributions) was planned 
to decreased from 33.5% in 2006 to 28.5% in 2007 (Strategy, 
2007).
 7 See also: http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/business/deciding-
to-stop/handling-bankruptcy-and-starting-afresh/hungary/in-
dex_en.htm,  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/LAWANDJUSTICE/GILD/GILDCOUNTRIES/GIL
DhUNGARY/0,,contentMDK:20113725~menuPK:262473~
pagePK:157658~piPK:157731~theSitePK:262467,00.html#_
Toc40673749
 8 hungary is among the countries in which the perceived opportu-
nities to start a business have witnesses a sharp decline in 2008 
(GEM, 2008).
 9 The programme included a Micro Credit Programme, a Midi 
Credit, the Europe Technological Catching-up Investment Credit 
Programme and the Széchenyi Card, by far the most successful 
program offering access to a maximum of EUR 40 000 credit (in-
creased to EUR 100 000 in QI 2006) for unlimited use, to manage 
liquidity problems, subject to a simplified procedure, with the 
state budget providing a 50% guarantee fee subsidy for every 
card issued and with a state interest subsidy of 2%.
10  Government gross consolidated debt, which was 87.4% in 1995 
went down to 52.1% by 2001. it increased again to 65.9% in 2007 
and 72.9% in 2008, by far the highest among the new EU mem-
ber countries (Staehr, 2010) (Eurostat data).
11 The Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) is the lowest in hun-
gary among the EU-27. ESI is a composite indicator made up 
of five sectoral confidence indicators with different weights: 
Industrial confidence indicator, Services confidence indicator, 
Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence indica-
tor, Retail trade confidence indicator. Source: http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/tgm/printTable.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language
=en&pcode=teibs010&printPreview=true# (22 March 2010). On 
the current situation and prospects of the hungarian economy see 
MNDE 2010a.
12 home prices are expected to drop 9% in 2010 after adjusting 
for inflation, according to mortgage bank FhB. Prices fell an 
inflation-adjusted 7.5% in 2009. http://www.xpatloop.com/news/
home_values_in_hungary__to_decline_this_year (22 March 
2010). According to the hungarian Central Bank (MNB), infla-
tion-adjusted house prices fell by an average of 4.2% in 2008, 
5.7% in 2007, 5.3% in 2006 and 2.7% in 2005.
13 Financial (credit and capital programmes) and support schemes 
for enterprises have been increased as a result of the crisis. Their 
overall amount will be approximately hUF 1,400 billion (ap-
proximately €4.8 billion) in 2009 and 2010 (approximately 5% 
of the GDP and 35% of the total banking SME credit portfolio). 
To this hUF 900 billion (€3.1 billion) loans guarantee should be 
added (MEh 2009).
14 The Financial Crisis Survey, implemented in June and July 2009, 
measures the effects of this crisis on 1,686 firms in six countries 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Bulgaria, hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, and Turkey.
15 Registered unemployment is considerably higher than before 
the crisis and rising (particularly among foreign workers, less 
educated workers and minorities), although not as high as at the 
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decade beginning. A significant part of the adjustment has come 
in the form of a shorter workweek, short-term contracts and in-
creased regional labor mobility: employment has consequently 
contracted less than aggregate economic activity but underem-
ployment has risen. higher labour mobility and greater willing-
ness to accept offered position can also be observed. (Svejnar 
– Semerak, 2009).
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50. KöZGAZdÁSZ-VÁNdOrGyÛLÉS
Fontos és kerek évfordulóhoz érkezett 2012-ben a Magyar Közgazdasági Tár-
saság: 
Átalakulás és konszolidáció a magyar gazdaságban 
és gazdaságirányításban
címmel immár az 50. Közgazdász-vándorgyűlést rendezzük meg 2012. szeptember 27. és 29. között Eger-
ben. A jubileumi közgazdász-vándorgyűlés programtervezete és jelentkezési lapja már letölthető a hon-
lapunkon, és várhatóan augusztus első napjaiban elindul az on-line regisztráció is (http://www.mkt.hu/
hirek.php?w=368).
A közgazdász-vándorgyűlések a hazai közgazdász szakma legrangosabb és legnagyobb éves összejövetelei:  
a háromnapos tanácskozások plenáris és szekcióülésein vezető gazdaságpolitikusok – jelenlegi és volt kormány-
tagok, szakpolitikusok –, a pénzügyi és üzleti élet kulcsszereplői, gazdaságkutatók, akadémikusok és egyetemi 
tanárok tartanak előadásokat a mintegy 400–700 fős, hazai és határainkon túli magyar közgazdászokból álló 
hallgatóság előtt. A vándorgyűlés szeptember 27-én, csütörtökön délután – hagyományainkhoz híven – egy 
plenáris üléssel veszi kezdetét. A rendezvény második napja a szekcióüléseké lesz: délelőtt öt szekcióban (ter-
vezés és államháztartás; vállalati gazdálkodás; bankok és finanszírozás; külkereskedelem és tőkekapcsolatok; 
informatika) vitathatják meg az egyes területek kérdéseit a résztvevők. Pénteken délután gazdaságpolitikai 
plenáris üléssel folytatódik a program. A zárónapon, szombaton délelőtt pedig a Költségvetési Tanács tart majd 
„rendkívüli nyílt ülést” a plenáris ülés hallgatósága előtt.
Meggyőződésünk, hogy a jubileumi, 50. Közgazdász-vándorgyűlés méltó helyszínen, az egri Park Hotelben, 
a Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság hagyományaihoz híven tartalmas vitákkal járul majd hozzá ahhoz, hogy minél 
szélesebb körű szakmai párbeszéd övezze a magyar gazdaságpolitika alakítását.
